Two divided visual Weld priming experiments examined cerebral asymmetries for understanding metaphors varying in sentence constraint. Experiment 1 investigated ambiguous words (e.g., SWEET and BRIGHT) with literal and metaphoric meanings in ambiguous and unambiguous sentence contexts, while Experiment 2 involved standard metaphors (e.g., The drink you gave me was a meteor) with sententially consistent and inconsistent targets (i.e., POTENT vs COMET). Similar literal and metaphor priming eVects were found in both visual Welds across most experimental conditions. However, RH processes also maintained activation of sententially inconsistent literal meanings following metaphoric expressions. These results do not strongly support the RH as the preferred substrate for metaphor comprehension (e.g., Anaki, Faust, & Kravetz, 1998; Bottini et al., 1994) , and suggest that processes in both hemispheres can support metaphor comprehension, although not via identical mechanisms. The LH may utilize sentence constraint to select and integrate only contextually relevant literal and metaphoric meanings, whereas the RH may be less sensitive to sentence context and can maintain the activation of some alternative interpretations. This may be potentially useful in situations where an initial understanding must be revised.
Introduction
A fundamental pursuit in cognitive science is the quest to get to the meaning of "meaning" by understanding language comprehension (i.e., how concepts are represented in our semantic memory, and how these representations are activated and retrieved when reading text or listening to discourse). Many valuable contributions to this quest have come from studies aimed toward understanding the neuropsychological basis of language processing (e.g., Burgess & Simpson, 1988; Caramazza & Hillis, 1990; Kutas & Hillyard, 1984; Zaidel, 1978) . Although neuropsychological investigations use a variety of methods (e.g., visual half-Weld studies, neuroimaging and electrophysiological techniques, studying split-brain patients and other brain-injured populations), they generally aim to understand language processes in terms of the brain systems subserving those processes.
Divided visual Weld (DVF) research has been particularly useful for understanding language comprehension in terms of the functioning of the cerebral hemispheres. This research (see Beeman & Chiarello, 1998 , for a review) has shown that although there is generally an overall advantage for linguistic stimuli presented to the RVF/LH, the RH is able to process and understand language to a certain extent. Moreover, it does so in a manner that is complementary, but qualitatively diVerent to the LH. Processing in the LH tends to be fast, deep, and narrowly focused, whereas RH processes tend to be slower and broader in scope, such that several alternate meanings may remain active over longer durations (Atchley, Burgess, & Keeney, 1999; Burgess & Simpson, 1988; Chiarello, 2003) . LH processing also appears more suited for comprehending sentences because it uses grammatical information and sentence constraint to integrate sentence meaning, while RH processes are less sensitive to syntactic structure, relying mainly on wordlevel semantic relations (Faust, 1998; Faust & Chiarello, 1998a , 1998b .
Most DVF investigations have focused on literal language, but the most intriguing challenge for theories of natural language comprehension involves the use of Wgurative expressions. In Wgurative language the intended meaning diVers from the meaning of what is literally expressed, such that the concept of "meaning" itself is extended to its limits (Geiger & Ward, 1999; HoVman, 1984) . Several researchers (e.g., Bottini et al., 1994; HoVman, 1984; Ortony, 1993) have noted that the use of Wgurative language is not restricted to poetic or literary devices, but occurs very frequently and is pervasive to all human communication and cognition. It has been estimated that Wgures of speech occur at the rate of about 4 per minute of speech (Abkarian, Jones, & West, 1992) . Therefore, to be complete, neurocognitive theories must account for Wgurative aspects of language such as understanding metaphors.
Although the LH is generally considered the dominant neural substrate for linguistic processing, RH processes may be preferentially involved in the comprehension of metaphors and other Wgurative forms (e.g., Anaki et al., 1998; Bottini et al., 1994; Burgess & Chiarello, 1996; Sabbagh, 1999) . This conclusion, however, is primarily based on research conducted with brain-injured individuals (e.g., Brownell, Potter, Bihrle, & Gardner, 1984 Kempler, Van Lancker, Marchman, & Bates, 1999; McIntyre, Pritchard, & Lombroso, 1976) . It is thus unclear to what extent these results can be used to make inferences about the nature of processing in the "normal" (noninjured) RH and LH. Although some studies of normal participants support the RH as more involved in metaphor comprehension (e.g., Anaki et al., 1998; Bottini et al., 1994; Mashal, Faust, & Hendler, in press) , results from other investigations are either equivocal (Faust & Weisper, 2000) or fail to show preferential RH metaphor processing (Coulson & Van Petten, 2000; Lee & Dapretto, 2003; Rapp, Leube, Erb, Grodd, & Kircher, 2004) . Moreover, the evidence from several recent studies of brain-lesioned participants has either only weakly supported (e.g., Gagnon, Goulet, Giroux, & Joanette, 2003) , or failed to support the RH metaphor hypothesis (e.g., Giora, Zaidel, Soroker, Batori, & Kasher, 2000; Tompkins, 1990) . A summary of this research is presented in Table 1 , which also illustrates the considerable variability in the materials and procedures used in prior studies. It is thus diYcult to draw Wrm empirical conclusions about each hemisphere's ability to understand metaphoric language.
There are several theoretical reasons why RH processes may be better suited than LH processes for comprehending Wgurative language. Some researchers have proposed greater RH involvement in the various higher-level, topdown, and more complex sentence integration processes assumed to occur during metaphor comprehension (Bottini et al., 1994; Burgess & Chiarello, 1996; Martin & McDonald, 2003; Sabbagh, 1999) . Examples of these processes include generating inferences (Bottini et al., 1994; Coulson & Matlock, 2001; HoVman, 1984) , analogical reasoning (Gentner, 1989; Gentner, Bowdle, WolV, & Boronat, 2001) , conceptual blending, mapping, and elaboration (Coulson & Van Petten, 2002; Gentner & WolV, 2000; Kintsch, 2000) , and social aspects of communication such as pragmatics (Sabbagh, 1999; Sadock, 1993) . Considerable research has shown that the RH does indeed seem to be preferentially involved in such high-level processing (e.g., Happe, Brownell, & Winner, 1999; Luo et al., 2003; Mason & Just, 2004; Robertson et al., 2000; Sabbagh, Moulson, & Harkness, 2004) .
In contrast, other accounts have focused on more basic bottom-up semantic activation processes (e.g., Anaki et al., 1998; Beeman, 1998; Burgess & Chiarello, 1996) , with the RH claimed to activate a broad range of meaning including distantly related concepts and peripheral features, and to simultaneously maintain the activation of multiple meanings, even if they are inconsistent with a given context. LH processes, on the other hand, may only select and maintain the activation of the most closely related concepts and central aspects of meaning. Such proposals are based on demonstrations that contextually inconsistent or grammatically incongruous words are often primed in the RH but not in the LH (Arambel & Chiarello, 2006; Faust & Chiarello, 1998a) , that only dominant and strongly associated meanings tend to be maintained in the LH (e.g., Anaki et al., 1998; Burgess & Simpson, 1988; Nakagawa, 1991) , whereas both dominant and subordinate meanings (e.g., Atchley et al., 1999; Burgess & Simpson, 1988) , non-associated category members (Collins, 1999; Koivisto, 1997) , and metaphoric meanings (Anaki et al., 1998) all show RH activation, particularly at long SOAs.
These claims can be incorporated into Beeman's FineCoarse Coding theory (Beeman, 1993 (Beeman, , 1998 Beeman et al., 1994) , which postulates that RH functioning is such that it weakly activates "broad semantic Welds," whereas the LH "Wnely codes" information, activating small semantic Welds consisting of only the closest and most central aspects of meaning. The broader RH activation of semantic representations is assumed to result in the overlap of some semantic Welds, allowing relations between those concepts to emerge, and result in the activation of concepts that "inferentially connect those distantly related words" (Beeman & Chiarello, 1998, p. 261 ). Understanding metaphors is assumed to (Beeman, 1998; Bottini et al., 1994; Brownell, 2000) . These are proposed to be activated by RH coarse coding mechanisms. An important possibility raised by Beeman (1998) and others (Chiarello, 2003; Faust & Gernsbacher, 1996; Titone, 1998) is that broad RH activation and maintenance of multiple meanings simply reXects diYculty selecting contextually appropriate aspects of meaning and/or suppressing irrelevant ones. For example, sentence comprehension processes in the RH appear to be primarily based upon less constrained activation of the meanings of words in the sentence. This idea has also been incorporated into Fine-Coarse Coding theory: although broad semantic activation by the RH is thought to be necessary for metaphor comprehension, it is not suYcient because LH processes are required to select and integrate the concepts activated by the RH (Beeman, 1998; Beeman, Bowden, & Gernsbacher, 2000) . Studies have shown that the LH does indeed appear to be superior than the RH at processing semantic, syntactic, and grammatical constraints to activate and select only contextually relevant meanings (Arambel & Chiarello, 2006; Faust & Chiarello, 1998a; .
In summary, the contribution of each hemisphere to metaphor comprehension is presently unclear. RH involvement in understanding metaphors may occur at higher levels of linguistic processing, or may simply result from the broad activation and maintenance of multiple aspects of meaning. Of course, RH processes could be involved in both bottom-up and top-down aspects of Wgurative processing (e.g., Burgess & Chiarello, 1996) . With respect to LH processing, although a smaller range of meanings seem to be maintained, the LH appears to be more sensitive to contextual constraint and to be primarily responsible for the selection and integration of sentence meaning. Hence, it is plausible that LH processing of metaphors could occur in supportive sentence contexts.
The purpose of the present study was to investigate these issues for two types of metaphoric expressions and sentence contexts of increasing constraint. Experiment 1 examined hemisphere diVerences for processing literal and metaphoric meanings of lexical metaphors (polysemous words with a literal and Wgurative sense), in sentences that were either unambiguous or ambiguous regarding the intended meaning. This experiment was thus designed to examine cerebral asymmetries for literal and metaphoric meaning activation across more or less constrained sentence contexts. In such stimuli, metaphoric meaning is simply understood by activating the extended Wgurative sense of these concepts. In contrast, Experiment 2 investigated hemispheric processing of standard 2-concept "an X is a Y" metaphors (e.g., His girlfriend's face was a storm). Although understanding these expressions also requires activating more distant aspects of meaning, their comprehension additionally involves more complex conceptual integration processes with the precise metaphoric meaning only emerging upon understanding the entire sentence
Note.
From top to bottom, the (Coulson & Matlock, 2001; Gentner & WolV, 2000; Gineste, Indurkhya, & Scart, 2000) . This experiment thus examined the degree to which each hemisphere is also involved in some higher-level metaphor comprehension processes. Experiment 2 was also designed to determine the extent to which each hemisphere maintains contextually inconsistent aspects of meaning, or can select only contextually appropriate literal and metaphoric meanings. SpeciWc predictions for each experiment will be discussed herein, but are summarized as follows. For RVF/LH trials processing metaphoric meaning in ambiguous contexts should be more diYcult than in a supportive unambiguous sentence. In contrast, if the primary contribution of the RH to metaphor comprehension results from a broader and sustained activation of semantics, then LVF/RH processing of literal and metaphoric meaning should be relatively similar across diVerent types of sentence contexts. Alternatively, if the RH primarily contributes to the higherlevel processes involved in metaphor comprehension, then enhanced metaphoric processing for LVF/RH trials should only be demonstrated in the more complex "an X is a Y" metaphoric sentences.
Experiment 1
When a novel is described as mushy, the word "mushy" is intended to be metaphorical and describe a plot that is particularly emotional and romantic. The comprehension of such lexical metaphors is thought to result from activating underlying cross-domain conceptual correspondences (Gibbs, 1992; LakoV, 1993) . These authors claim that metaphors generally function to explain more diYcult, unfamiliar, and abstract conceptual domains such as romance in terms of concepts that are more well known and concrete like an object's Wrmness.
Lexical metaphor stimuli have been investigated in many previous neuropsychological studies (e.g., Anaki et al., 1998; Brownell et al., 1984 , Brownell, Simpson, Bihrle, Potter, & Gardner, 1990 Gagnon et al., 2003; Mashal et al., 2005) . Since they have both literal and Wgurative meanings, lexical metaphors are somewhat similar to ambiguous words. Indeed, when such stimuli were investigated using a DVF priming procedure (Anaki et al., 1998) , the results were similar to the Wndings obtained for the subordinate meanings of typical ambiguous words like BANK (e.g., Atchley et al., 1999; Burgess & Simpson, 1988) . In particular, the metaphoric sense was active for both visual Welds early in timecourse, but was only maintained in the LVF/RH following a longer duration (Anaki et al., 1998) . Except for a recent study of brain-injured individuals by Klepousniotou and Baum (2005) previous neuropsychological research with lexical metaphors has only involved studying these stimuli in minimal contexts such as word pairs or triads, rather than in more natural sentence contexts. In this experiment we investigate cerebral asymmetries in normal participants for processing lexical metaphors in sentence contexts that were either ambiguous or unambiguous to the intended meaning.
Several sentence priming experiments with non-metaphoric ambiguous words like SPADE (e.g., Faust & Chiarello, 1998a; Faust & Gernsbacher, 1996; Meyer & Peterson, 2000; Titone, 1998) have shown that when the context is neutral or ambiguous, RVF/LH processing appears to default to a selection of the dominant meaning of the ambiguous word, particularly at longer SOAs. If the context is suYciently constraining and unambiguous, however, then the contextually appropriate meaning seems to be activated and selected, even if that meaning is much less frequent. These Wndings, in addition to other results demonstrating LH sensitivity to various sentence constraints Faust & Chiarello, 1998a , 1998b , would predict that both literal and metaphor targets should be primed in the RVF/LH following an unambiguous sentence. However, RVF/LH metaphor priming would not be expected after ambiguous contexts because in those instances the dominant literal meaning should be selected and maintained (Anaki et al., 1998; Beeman, 1998; Meyer & Peterson, 2000; Titone, 1998) .
In contrast, RH processes may be less sensitive to sentence constraint. When LVF/RH targets follow sentences biased toward a particular meaning of an ambiguous word, the activation of alternate meanings is maintained, even if the meanings are contextually inconsistent (Beeman, 1998; Faust & Chiarello, 1998a; Faust & Gernsbacher, 1996) . Thus, if the RH is less aVected by sentence constraint and able to sustain the activation of multiple meanings, then LVF/RH literal and metaphor priming should be of similar magnitude across both ambiguous and unambiguous contexts. However, RH sentence comprehension processes have also been claimed to mainly rely on the bottom-up activation of semantic representations and intra-lexical relations among the words in a sentence (Faust, 1998) . Since unambiguous sentences are semantically "richer," because disambiguating words will generally be more strongly related to each other and to the targets (e.g., I heard they were all consumed by SHARKS/GUILT, vs All the small Wsh were consumed by SHARKS, and The cheating students were consumed by GUILT), it was predicted that both literal and metaphoric priming would be larger with unambiguous contexts.
In summary, both literal and metaphor priming eVects were expected in each visual Weld after unambiguous sentence contexts. Of greatest interest, however, is whether metaphor targets will be primed in either visual Weld following ambiguous contexts. In the latter condition, diYculty generating and maintaining subordinate Wgurative meanings should not produce RVF/LH priming, but broader semantic activation processes should yield metaphor priming for LVF/RH trials.
Method

Participants
Participants were 64 (32 male) right-handed, native English speaking UCR undergraduates with normal or cor-rected-to-normal vision. None participated in the stimulus norming procedures described below. Participants received either course credit or pay ($7/hr).
Materials
Stimulus creation began with a pool of 200 ambiguous lexical metaphor words (e.g., BRIGHT and SPICY). A set of four sentences was generated for every ambiguous word, such that each appeared in both an ambiguous and unambiguous sentence context with a target word that either literally or metaphorically completed the sentence. Ambiguous sentences were constructed so that the exact meaning (i.e., literal or metaphoric) of the sentence, and hence of the lexical metaphor, would be unclear until the subsequent presentation of a lateralized target word (e.g., We all really admired the bright COLORS/STUDENT). Unambiguous sentences contained the same critical ambiguous word, but the context was altered such that the meaning of the sentence, and hence the lexical metaphor, was more clearly literally or metaphorically intended (e.g., It's the building with the bright COLORS vs The teacher praised the bright STUDENT). Sentence length was kept to 42 characters or less, with eVorts made to keep ambiguous word position and sentence length similar across conditions.
To validate our stimulus construction, several norming experiments were conducted. First, written interpretations were collected from 44 participants, with every sentence from each set of four interpreted by 11 participants. Final experimental stimuli were generally selected if they were consistently literally or metaphorically interpreted by at least 73% of participants. Literal sentences were interpreted as such by 93% of participants on average, while 91% of participants consistently understood the metaphoric sentences. To compute cloze probabilities, another group of 30 participants were presented with incomplete sentences on a computer and asked to type in a single word that would be a sensible completion to the sentence. Final stimuli were generally selected if unambiguous contexts were completed by appropriate literal or metaphoric words by at least 70% of participants. Unambiguous literal sentences were completed by words indicating a literal understanding of the ambiguous word by a mean of 97% of participants, and metaphoric sentences were metaphorically completed by 89% of participants on average. Fifty-nine percent of completions to ambiguous sentences were literal, whereas only 31% of ambiguous sentences were metaphorically completed, reXecting the dominance of the literal sense of these ambiguous words. Unambiguous sentences were thus understood as being appropriately literally or metaphorically intended, and ambiguous contexts were indeed interpreted as being less constrained, although with a bias toward literal interpretations and completions. Sentences were generally of low or moderate constraint, and cloze probabilities for the experimental literal (22%) and metaphor targets (25%) were not signiWcantly diVerent, t (284) D ¡0.80, ns.
On the basis of the norming results 144 sets of items were selected as experimental stimuli. Table 2 provides the mean rated familiarity, imageability, and length of the literal and metaphorically related target words used in the experiment. Familiarity and imageability ratings were obtained from a variety of databases (Altarriba et al., 1999; Bird, Framklin, & Howard, 2001; Chiarello, Liu, & Faust, 2001 Friendly, Franklin, HoVman, & Rubin, 1982; Kacinik, Shears, & Chiarello, 2000; Wilson, 1988) , or were collected from a group of 20 UCR undergraduates not participating in the experiment. Literal targets were signiWcantly more imageable than metaphor targets, 1 t(284) D 12.81, p < .0001, but they did not diVer in length, familiarity, and word class (i.e., all but one of the targets were nouns). Examples of sentence stimuli are provided in Appendix A.
Each participant saw both the literal and metaphoric targets for a given item, but with one target appearing in a related sentence condition in one visual Weld, while the other target was shown in the opposite visual Weld following an unrelated sentence prime. Every participant thus saw a total of 288 target words, which required the creation of four stimulus lists so that each literal and metaphoric target appeared in both types of sentence and relatedness conditions. Each list had two versions so that every target also appeared in each visual Weld across subjects. Thus, there were 18 critical items per visual Weld per condition per list.
An additional set of 144 Wller sentences paired with nonword targets was also created. Non-words were orthographically legal and pronounceable letter strings created by altering a single letter from words not included in the stimulus list. They were matched to the word targets for length. In addition, so that the type of sentence prime could not be used to predict a word or non-word target, nonword sentences primes were designed to be of similar composition and length as the critical sentences. These 144 nonword targets were combined with the 288 critical stimulus pairs, resulting in a total of 432 experimental trials. Lastly, an additional list of 40 items, similar to the experimental stimuli, was also created for the practice list.
All stimuli were presented in black on a white background. Sentence primes were presented in lowercase 18-point Helvetica font, with initial letter capitalized, while targets were displayed using uppercase 20-point Helvetica font. This resulted in target stimuli subtending 0.55° vertical visual angle and horizontal visual angles ranging from 1.25°t o 4.00°.
Apparatus
Participants were tested individually in quiet dimly lit testing rooms. They were seated 60 cm in front of an Apple Vision 1710 monitor, with a head rest used to stabilize head position. Power Macintosh 7500/100 computers and the Psyscope software package (Cohen, Macwhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993) were used to control the presentation of stimuli, the timing of events, and record responses made by participants. The "0" and "." keys on the computer's numeric keypad were used to register their lexical decision responses with the index and middle Wngers of their right hand. Half of the participants used the 0 key for their "word" response. This response mapping was reversed for the other half of the participants.
Design and procedure
The experiment consisted of a 2 £ 2 £ 2 £ 2 repeated measures design examining sentence condition (ambiguous, unambiguous), target type (literal, metaphor), relatedness (related, unrelated), and visual Weld (right, left). Eight participants were run on each of the eight stimulus lists. They were tested in single sessions consisting of six experimental blocks of 72 trials each. The experimental blocks were preceded by 40 practice items. Each trial began with a central Wxation cross for 500 ms, which was immediately followed and replaced by a centrally presented incomplete sentence. Sentences less than 30 characters were presented for 900 ms, sentences with 31-39 characters were presented for 1200 ms, and sentences with 40-42 characters were presented for 1400 ms. These durations were chosen based on previous work in our lab (Arambel & Chiarello, 2006) and pilot testing. Immediately after the sentence prime disappeared, a 450 ms Xickering Wxation cross sequence was initiated, with the last Wxation cross remaining on the screen for 500 ms. Targets were presented for 150 ms at an eccentricity of 1.96°, 600 ms after the sentence disappeared. The Wxation cross thus remained on the screen for 200 ms after the oVset of the target.
Participants were told that the experiment was investigating how well people can process sentences and recognize things they are not directly looking at. They were instructed to read each sentence quickly to themselves and told that they would be asked some questions about the sentences after the experiment. Participants were also instructed to immediately Wxate and keep their gaze focused on the plus sign as soon as it re-appeared and started Xickering. Targets were randomly presented to the RVF or LVF, with the order of stimulus presentation randomized for each participant. Participants were instructed to decide whether each target was a word or non-word as quickly and accurately as possible. They were allowed 4000 ms to respond. The next trial began either 1000 ms after a response was made or the timeout interval had elapsed. After the experiment was complete, participants were given a questionnaire with 24 sentences from the experiment and 24 new sentences similar to those shown in the experiment. They were asked to mark an "X" next to the sentences they remembered seeing in the experiment. This memory test provided evidence that participants read the sentence primes. Mean hit rate was 80% and the mean false-alarm rate was 14%. The entire testing session lasted about 75 min.
Results
A 2 (ambiguous versus unambiguous context) £ 2 (related versus unrelated sentence primes) £ 2 (literal versus metaphor target) £ 2 (RVF, LVF) repeated measures ANOVA was performed on both the reaction time (RT) and accuracy (% correct) data from word target trials. Analysis of the results was done for both participants (F1) and items (F2). If a particular RT exceeded that participant's mean RT for a given condition by more than 2.5 standard deviations it was trimmed to the value equal to §2.5 standard deviations. The means for RT and accuracy can be found in Tables 3 and 4, . None of the other interactions were signiWcant. In terms of the predictions, it is particularly important to note that the three-way target type by relatedness by context condition interaction was not signiWcant in either visual Weld (Fs < 1) for either RT or accuracy. These Wndings indicate that both the literal and metaphor priming eVects obtained in each visual Weld were statistically equivalent, although all priming eVects tended to be larger following unambiguous compared to ambiguous sentence contexts (see Tables 3 and 4) .
Discussion
Experiment 1 was designed to investigate hemisphere diVerences in comprehending ambiguous words with literal and metaphoric meanings when they occur in relatively more or less constrained sentence contexts. Lexical metaphors were presented in sentence contexts that were either ambiguous or biased towards a speciWc meaning. The LVF/ RH results were generally as predicted: similar literal and metaphor priming eVects were obtained with both ambiguous and unambiguous sentences, although the magnitude of priming was greater after unambiguous contexts. These results indicate that RH processing can derive beneWt from both literal and Wgurative aspects of meaning, and provide further evidence that RH processes can maintain the activation of multiple meanings (Atchley et al., 1999; Burgess & Simpson, 1988; Faust & Chiarello, 1998a; Faust & Gernsbacher, 1996) . In addition, the Wnding that priming eVects increased from ambiguous to unambiguous sentences suggests that the RH has some sensitivity to sentence constraint, in accordance with previous claims (e.g., Chiarello et al., 2001; Coulson, Federmeier, Van Petten, & Kutas, 2005; Federmeier & Kutas, 1999; Liu, 2002) . Because the unambiguous sentences were semantically "richer" these greater priming eVects may be due to stronger semantic relations between the sentence and target words rather than message-level processes per se.
The occurrence of literal and metaphoric priming in the RVF/LH after unambiguous sentences also supported predictions that LH sentence processes would take advantage of sentence constraint to activate and select the most contextually consistent meaning, regardless of whether it was literal or Wgurative. RVF/LH priming was also found for both literal and metaphor targets after ambiguous sentences. Based on previous DVF studies (Anaki et al., 1998; Burgess & Simpson, 1988; Meyer & Peterson, 2000; Titone, 1998) , it had been predicted that LH processing would default to the activation and selection of only dominant To account for this Wnding, it is important to note that the relation between the literal and Wgurative sense of lexical metaphors is not arbitrary because the metaphoric sense is generally extended from the literal meaning (Geiger & Ward, 1999; LakoV, 1993; Rumelhart, 1993) . This is in contrast to typical ambiguous words like BAT, whose meanings are mutually exclusive and therefore must engender competition because only a single meaning can be selected. Since the literal and Wgurative senses of a lexical metaphor are related, they may not need to compete for activation in the same way (Frisson & Pickering, 2001 ). Indeed, Pickering (1999, 2001) suggest that the initial processing of such words may occur by activating a very general underspeciWed meaning that is compatible with all the senses. It should also be noted that, unlike some prior studies (e.g., Faust & Gernsbacher, 1996) , the present stimuli were designed so that both literal and metaphor targets were always consistent with the ambiguous context. If the literal and metaphoric senses do not have to compete for activation because they share a common underspeciWed meaning, then as long as they do not become semantically incongruous with the context, the processor may not have to choose which sense to adopt (Frisson & Pickering, 1999 . The current Wndings indicate that LH processes can maintain the activation of various related senses of a word, provided they are consistent with the sentence context. This is in contrast to non-metaphoric ambiguous words presented in ambiguous sentences, where the LH must select between distinct incompatible meanings and may default to the most dominant meaning (e.g., Meyer & Peterson, 2000; Titone, 1998) .
In summary, contextual constraint, rather than meaning dominance, may be the critical factor determining hemisphere diVerences in literal versus metaphoric meaning activation in sentences. To conWrm this, future studies should examine cerebral asymmetries for cases where the sentenceWnal target is unexpected or even contextually inconsistent (e.g., She's much prettier without those crooked LAWYERS, Matt was cheated by those crooked TEETH).
The activation of contextually appropriate versus contextually irrelevant aspects of meaning was explored in Experiment 2 using more complex 2-concept "an X is a Y" metaphors (e.g., His girlfriend's face was a storm). Although activating Wgurative aspects of word meaning is undoubtedly involved in the comprehension of such metaphoric expressions, they are assumed to additionally involve more complex conceptual blending and sentence integration processes (Bottini et al., 1994; Coulson & Matlock, 2001; Gentner & WolV, 2000) . There is some evidence indicating preferential involvement of the RH in such higher-level aspects of comprehension (e.g., Happe et al., 1999; Luo et al., 2003; Mason & Just, 2004; Robertson et al., 2000) . However, others have argued that the RH is simply involved in the broad activation and maintenance of semantic representations, but the actual selection and integration required for complete comprehension must be done by LH processes (Beeman, 1998; Beeman et al., 2000) . The goal of Experiment 2 was to evaluate these possibilities.
Experiment 2
The typical conceptualization of a "metaphor" is represented by multi-word metaphoric expressions like her lawyer is a shark which are often semantically anomalous if interpreted literally (Glucksberg & Keysar, 1993) . Comprehension involves recognizing that one concept (a shark), is being used to illuminate an aspect of another "topic" concept (the lawyer). The similarity or analogy between these otherwise dissimilar domains must be inferred and mapped between these concepts in order to understand the phrase (i.e., since sharks are vicious and tenacious, her lawyer must also be vicious and tenacious). The process of comprehending these metaphors is also assumed to involve selecting and enhancing the activation of metaphorically relevant features, while suppressing those inappropriate for the metaphoric interpretation (Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson, & Werner, 2001; Glucksberg, Newsome, & Goldvarg, 2001 ). Interestingly, several researchers have noted that the juxtaposition of conceptual domains involved in interpreting these metaphors often entails a meaning that emerges from processing the metaphor as a whole, rather than from the comprehension of individual words (Coulson & Matlock, 2001; Gineste et al., 2000; Tourangeau & Rips, 1991) . These metaphoric expressions thus diVer from the lexical metaphors used in Experiment 1, where the Wgurative sense is part of that word's representation and whose comprehension generally occurs by directly activating the metaphoric meaning.
Sentential consistency and meaning selection were investigated in the current experiment by having X is a Y literal and metaphoric sentence primes paired with targets related to either the literal or metaphoric meaning in a fully crossed 2 £ 2 design (i.e., literal sentence-literal target, metaphor sentence-metaphor target, literal sentence-metaphor target, and metaphor sentence-literal target). Table 5 provides examples of stimulus items across these diVerent conditions. Sentential consistency refers to whether the target is consistent and contextually appropriate with the meaning of the sentence context as a whole (i.e., whether the target correctly represents the literal or metaphoric meaning of the entire sentence, such that a literal sentence followed by a literal target, and a metaphor sentence with a metaphor target are sententially consistent conditions, and the literal sentence-metaphor target and metaphor sentence-literal target represent the sententially inconsistent cases). Relatedness, on the other hand, refers to whether there is any sort of lexical-semantic relation between the target word and the critical concept(s) in the sentence (generally the metaphor vehicle or "Y" concept of the metaphoric sentence) even though that speciWc relation may not reXect the meaning of the sentence as a whole. For the example in Table 5 , the target WILTED is related to the literal meaning of petals, but is sententially inconsistent with the meaning of petals in the metaphoric sentence "Henry thought her eyes were petals." Similarly, the metaphor target LOVELY is consistent with and represents the meaning of petals in that metaphoric sentence, but is inconsistent with the meaning of petals in the literal sentence "That plant keeps losing its petals." If meaning availability is broad and unconstrained, then one could observe priming for related targets following inconsistent sentences.
There were related and unrelated cases for all four of the sententially consistent and inconsistent conditions described above. Unrelated sentence prime and target pairs were obtained by re-pairing targets with completely unrelated sentence primes. Priming eVects were computed by subtracting responses to related targets from unrelated targets. To preserve the orthogonal nature of the design, this was done separately for both sententially consistent or inconsistent sentence primes. However, it should be noted, as illustrated in Table 5 , that the variable of sentential "consistency" does not really mean anything in relation to the unrelated sentence prime and targets, since all of these stimulus pairs are essentially unrelated. Predictions diVered for the consistent and inconsistent sentences within each visual Weld.
LVF/RH
Priming was expected when literal targets followed consistent literal sentences. If the RH is preferentially involved in the higher-level processes assumed to be involved in understanding more complex metaphors, then the current experiment should demonstrate the strongest RH contribution to metaphoric processing. Hence, we predict priming for sententially consistent metaphor targets in the LVF/RH. Further, if RH processes are sensitive to a message-level representation of sentence meaning (e.g., Federmeier & Kutas, 1999; Liu, 2002) , then sententially inconsistent literal and metaphor targets should not be primed in the LVF/RH. Alternatively, if semantic activation in the RH is generally broad and unconstrained by sentence context, with multiple meanings active simultaneously, then priming would also be expected for sententially inconsistent, but "related" literal and metaphor targets.
RVF/LH
Priming was expected when literal targets followed consistent literal sentences. If the LH is not involved in higher level processing of more complex metaphors, then sententially consistent RVF/LH metaphor priming may not occur, or be smaller than the priming eVect obtained for the LVF/RH. Alternatively, the Wndings from Experiment 1 suggest that LH sentence comprehension processes will facilitate the activation of metaphoric meaning and show signiWcant priming for consistent metaphor targets in the RVF/LH. Further, if the LH can process sentences to select and maintain the activation of contextually relevant meanings, then neither inconsistent literal nor inconsistent metaphor targets should be primed in the RVF/LH. Indeed, it is possible that any sententially inconsistent literal and metaphoric aspects of meaning may even be suppressed to show an inhibitory (i.e., negative priming) eVect (Gernsbacher et al., 2001 ).
Method
Participants
Participants consisted of 48 (24 male) right-handed, native English speaking UCR undergraduates with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They were not involved in either norming study described below, nor in Experiment 1. Students participated for either 1 h of course credit and $3.00, or received $10.00.
Materials
Stimulus selection began by generating 210 metaphoric "an X is a Y" sentences. Some were taken from published studies (e.g., Blasko & Connine, 1993; Bottini et al., 1994; Camac & Glucksberg, 1984; Coulson & Matlock, 2001; Coulson & Van Petten, 2002; Goldvarg & Glucksberg, 1998; Katz, Paivio, Marschark, & Clark, 1988) , and Miall, 1982; Palmatier, 1995; Palmatier & Ray, 1989; Sommer & Weiss, 1996) , but most were created by the experimenter. A literal sentence was also generated for each metaphor item. For example, the literal sentence "Tonight we may be able to see a meteor" was created to pair with the metaphoric sentence "The drink you gave me was a meteor." Literal and metaphor sentences were designed to be similar in length and in the number of content and function words. Mean lengths for metaphor and literal sentences were 36.9 and 37.7 characters, respectively, and they did not diVer signiWcantly, t(318) D ¡1.76, p D .08 (two-tailed). Target words related to the literal and metaphoric meaning of each sentence were also generated (e.g., COMET and POTENT, for the above sentences, respectively). Literal targets were selected to represent literal aspects of vehicle concepts incongruent with the meaning of the metaphor sentence. Similar attempts were made to have metaphor targets be inappropriate with the literal meaning, but this was not always possible because metaphoric meaning can arise from salient features of a concept's literal meaning. For example, the metaphor target AID is a central feature of the meaning of crutch, as in the metaphor For some people alcohol is a crutch, but it would also be related to literal uses of crutch, as in Rob broke his leg and needed a crutch.
Several norming experiments were conducted to validate our stimulus selection. First, written interpretations were collected for metaphoric sentences to assess whether metaphoric meaning would be consistently understood by most individuals. At least 25 participants wrote their interpretation of what each metaphoric sentence meant. The interpretations were grouped by conceptual similarity, so that the frequency of concepts in response to each sentence could be tallied. These interpretations were used to eliminate or modify some of the metaphoric sentences and targets.
Sentence-target relatedness ratings were then collected on the remaining set of 204 items which were split into four counter-balanced lists. Each list contained both literal and metaphor sentences and targets in similar conditions to those eventually used in the experiment. One of the targets was paired with a related sentence that was either sententially consistent (e.g., metaphor sentence-metaphor target or literal sentence-literal target) or inconsistent with the meaning of the target (e.g., metaphor sentence-literal target or literal sentence-metaphor target). The other target was paired with a completely unrelated sentence. See Table  5 (and Appendix A) for examples of stimuli across these diVerent conditions. The relatedness ratings were collected from a diVerent group of 48 participants (12 for each list), who were asked to decide (using a 5-point scale, 1 D not at all related and 5 D strongly related) the degree to which they thought the target word was related to the meaning of the sentence.
A 2 (consistent vs inconsistent sentence) £ 2 (related vs unrelated) £ 2 (literal vs metaphor target) repeated measures ANOVA of these ratings supported the suitability of these stimuli. There was a main eVect of relatedness, F(1, 47) D 1069.08, p < .0001, indicating that related targets were rated higher (mean D 3.27) than unrelated targets (mean D 1.21). More importantly, however, relatedness was found to signiWcantly interact with the kind of sentence context and target type, F(1, 47) D 458.57, p < .0001, demonstrating that literal and metaphor targets were deemed more highly related when they were consistent with the sentence context (4.17 and 4.27, respectively) than when they were inconsistent (2.55 and 2.57, respectively)-but note that metaphoric and literal targets were judged to be equally related. This interaction also indicated that although inconsistent targets were judged to be less related than contextually consistent stimuli, they were rated somewhat higher than completely unrelated items, F(1, 47) D 329.18, p < .0001. This result reXects the fact that participants may have noticed a relation between an inconsistent target and a lexical item(s) in the sentence, or that targets were still perceived to be related but this relation was weaker and more distant.
The Wnal experimental set of 160 literal and metaphoric sentence prime-target pairs was generally selected if mean relatedness ratings were 3.5 or greater (out of 5). As shown in Table 6 , both literal and metaphor targets were rated as being strongly related to their contextually consistent sentences, with metaphor targets slightly more related, t(318) D ¡1.99, p D .05. In addition, although metaphor targets were again signiWcantly less imageable than literal targets, t(318) D 12.85, p D .0001, they did not diVer in length or familiarity (see Table 6 ).
The Wnal set of experimental stimuli consisted of 320 critical sentence primes and targets, organized into four lists with each literal and metaphoric target occurring in both types of sentence (consistent, inconsistent) and relatedness conditions (see Appendix A for examples). There were two versions of each list, so that every target appeared in both visual Welds across subjects. Twenty critical items were thus shown per visual Weld per condition per list. These 320 stimuli were combined with an additional set of 160 literal and metaphoric Wller sentences paired with nonword targets. Non-word targets were matched to word targets for length. Lastly, a similar set of 40 stimuli was created for the practice list.
Design and procedure
A 2 £ 2 £ 2 £ 2 repeated measures design examining sentence condition (consistent, inconsistent), target type (literal, metaphor), relatedness (related, unrelated), and visual Weld (right, left) was used. Procedure was the same as for Sentences less than 30 characters were presented for 1000 ms, sentences with 31-39 characters were presented for 1400 ms, and sentences with 40-42 characters were presented for 1600 ms. These durations were based on pilot testing that indicated these sentence were slightly more diYcult to read and understand than stimuli from Experiment 1. Stimuli were presented using Power Macintosh G4 computers and Apple Xat-screen monitors. Results from the post-experiment memory test indicated that participants had again paid attention to and read the sentence primes, because the mean hit rate was 77% and the mean rate of false-alarms was 14%.
Results
A 2 (consistent versus inconsistent sentence) £ 2 (related versus unrelated targets) £ 2 (literal versus metaphor target) £ 2 (RVF, LVF) repeated measures ANOVA was performed on both the RT and accuracy (% correct) data. Recall that sentential consistency refers to whether the target did (literal sentence-literal target and metaphor sentence-metaphor target) or did not appropriately represent (literal sentence-metaphor target and metaphor sentenceliteral target) the meaning of the sentence context as a whole, whereas relatedness refers to whether there was any semantic relation between the critical word(s) in the sentence prime and target, even if that relation was sententially inconsistent.
The To test a priori predictions about the extent of literal and metaphor priming in each VF following consistent and inconsistent sentence contexts, and to explore the above four-way interaction, separate analyses were conducted on the RT results for each visual Weld.
For the RVF/LH, the only interaction found to be signiWcant was relatedness by sentence context condition [F1(1, 47) D 4.80, MSE D 3361, p < .05; F2(1, 159) D 3.55, MSE D 10,092, p D .061], indicating that priming was larger when targets were consistent with the sentence (36 ms) compared to when they followed a contextually inconsistent sentence (10 ms), for both literal and metaphor targets. The RVF/LH priming results for both RT and accuracy are illustrated in Fig. 1 , but not literal targets, both F1 and F2 < 1. These results indicate that although there was less LVF/RH priming for metaphor targets following inconsistent literal sentences than consistent metaphor sentences, similar priming eVects were obtained for literal targets regardless of whether they were presented after a consistent literal or inconsistent metaphor sentence. These LVF/RH RT and accuracy priming results are shown in Fig. 2 . No other interactions were found to be signiWcant in either the RT or accuracy results.
Finally, separate analyses were also performed for literal and metaphor targets in the sententially consistent conditions to test a priori predictions about whether literal and metaphor priming eVects were similar in size for each visual Weld. Although the magnitude of LVF/RH priming for sententially consistent metaphor targets appears larger than the priming eVect obtained in the RVF/LH, none of the relatedness by visual Weld interactions for either literal or metaphor targets were signiWcant in either the RT or accuracy data, most Fs < or near 1. These results indicate that similar priming eVects were obtained for both literal and metaphor targets in either visual Weld when they were consistent with the meaning of the sentence.
Discussion
Experiment 2 was conducted to examine cerebral asymmetries for interpreting more complex "an X is a Y" metaphoric expressions. Also of interest was investigating claims about each hemisphere's ability to select contextually appropriate aspects of meaning. Complete metaphoric and literal sentences were paired with targets related to the meaning of either the literal or metaphor sentence. The RVF/LH results were generally as predicted. Both literal and metaphor targets were signiWcantly primed when they were sententially consistent. The occurrence of priming for sententially consistent literal targets had been expected and provides further support to many current theoretical claims of meaning activation and sentence processing in the LH (e.g., Beeman, 1998; Chiarello et al., 2001; Faust, 1998; Faust & Chiarello, 1998a , 1998b . Of greater interest is the Wnding that consistent metaphor targets also showed priming in the RVF/LH. This Wnding contradicts the notion of the RH as the preferred substrate for metaphor comprehension (e.g., Bottini et al., 1994; Kempler et al., 1999; Sabbagh, 1999) , and indicates that along with understanding lexical metaphors (Experiment 1), LH processes can also support the conceptual selection and integration processes needed to understand more complex metaphoric expressions.
Also according to expectations, no RVF/LH priming was found for either literal or metaphor targets when they were sententially inappropriate, supporting claims that the LH is adept at processing sentence contexts to activate, select, and integrate only those aspects of meaning that are contextually relevant (Beeman, 1998; Beeman et al., 2000; Faust & Chiarello, 1998a) . The current Wndings, along with those from Experiment 1, provide strong evidence for LH metaphor comprehension such that understanding literal and metaphor meaning seems to be accomplished by similar processes in the LH. Finally, it is worth noting that although this experiment indicates that LH processes are mainly responsible for meaning selection, the lack of an inhibitory eVect for inconsistent targets does not support the claim that selection involves actively suppressing irrelevant information (Gernsbacher et al., 2001; Glucksberg et al., 2001 ). The LVF/RH Wndings also generally followed predictions. Literal and metaphor targets showed similar priming when they were sententially consistent, and the magnitude of these priming eVects was equivalent to the literal and metaphoric priming eVects obtained in the RVF/LH for sententially congruent targets. These Wndings indicate that both hemispheres were able to beneWt from the sentence context to activate the contextually appropriate meaning, regardless of whether the sentence was literal or Wgurative. Regarding the LVF/RH in particular, this experiment provides further evidence that the RH is involved in metaphor comprehension, and that this involvement generalizes to more complex "an X is a Y" metaphoric expressions. However, because the size of the priming eVect for sententially consistent metaphor targets was similar to that of the LH, these Wndings argue against the notion that either hemisphere is considerably more involved in understanding multi-word metaphoric expressions.
In contrast to the sententially consistent conditions, a diVerent pattern of results occurred for inconsistent targets in the LVF/RH. No priming was found for metaphor targets preceded by an inconsistent literal sentence, providing further support that the RH is sensitive to some aspects of sentence comprehension. This Wnding also demonstrates metaphoric meaning only emerges upon presentation of the metaphoric expression as a whole because literal sentences did not prime metaphor targets. Sententially inappropriate literal targets, on the other hand, were primed by inconsistent metaphor sentences, and this eVect was equivalent to the priming obtained when these literal targets followed a consistent literal sentence. This indicates that RH sensitivity to sentence context does not result in an exact representation of sentence meaning because some contextually inappropriate literal aspects of meaning remained active in the RH.
Recall that the norming study showed that literal and metaphor targets were judged to be equally related to their inconsistent sentences (2.55 and 2.57, respectively). This Wnding was also conWrmed with a computational way of assessing semantic relatedness, Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA, by Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998 ). The LSA model is able to capture the semantic relationships between lexical items without taking into account syntax, grammatical structure, and word order. LSA cosines for sententially inconsistent literal (.264) and metaphor targets (.261) were statistically equivalent, t(315) D ¡0.183, ns. Hence there was no evidence for diVerences in the relation of literal and metaphor targets to the inconsistent sentences in either the LSA cosines or relatedness ratings. Thus, it seems unlikely that the discrepant priming results for inconsistent literal and metaphor targets were due to underlying diVerences in semantic relatedness.
Although the general relatedness of literal and metaphoric sentence primes and targets was controlled, it is possible that there were diVerences in how strongly literal and metaphor targets were related to individual lexical items, particularly the Wnal words, in each sentence. This possibility can't be ruled out entirely, but it is unlikely because substantial diVerences between the relational strength of literal and metaphor targets to individual words in the sentences would probably also have been reXected in the sentencetarget relatedness norms that we did collect. The reason we chose to focus on and obtain relatedness ratings between targets and the meaning of the sentence, rather than individual words, was based on other data demonstrating that lexical priming eVects (i.e., single word prime and target) do not generalize to sentence priming situations with those stimuli, even in relatively minimal and ambiguous sentence contexts (Kacinik, 2003) .
Therefore, the main conclusion that should be drawn from these Wndings is that during the processing of metaphor sentences, RH-initiated processing broadly activates and maintains the literal meaning of words in the sentence, even once the metaphoric interpretation has been achieved and they are no longer relevant. A potential explanation is that metaphors span and merge two very diVerent conceptual domains (e.g., face and storm, as in His girlfriend's face was a storm). Integrating the meaning of these concepts so that the metaphor can be understood does not simply entail transferring a single or even several features, but involves re-structuring the entire semantic space so that the metaphoric meaning emerges from this altered conceptual space (Coulson & Matlock, 2001 ; see Coulson & Van Petten, 2000 & Kintsch, 2000 , for empirical demonstrations). Broadly activating both literal and Wgurative aspects of meaning for each concept are most likely essential to this process. Literal sentences, in contrast, generally consist of more closely related concepts (e.g., ship and storm, as in The ship was headed toward a storm) and probably do not require such extensive conceptual semantic activation and integration processes. Although both hemispheres appear to be involved in the semantic mapping and re-structuring processes required in metaphor comprehension, the exact manner by which each hemisphere contributes to this process remains to be speciWed. However, on the basis of the current Wndings, it is clear that RH involvement in these metaphoric conceptual blending processes results in the maintenance of literal aspects of meaning after they are no longer active in the LH, even when they are inconsistent with the sentence context. While this could simply be a consequence of less precise RH sentence processing and poorer selection abilities (Arambel & Chiarello, 2006; Beeman, 1998; Chiarello, 2003) , it might also be advantageous in situations requiring the revision of an initial interpretation (Beeman, 1998; Chiarello, 2003; Coulson & Williams, 2005) . Thus, the RH may be crucial in situations where a metaphor was initially understood in one way, but subsequent context indicated this as being incorrect, and necessitating the formation of an alternate interpretation.
These results also provide additional evidence that the most crucial aspect of RH processing for metaphor comprehension is not a broad activation of word meaning per se, since the scope of available meanings was found to depend on the preceding sentence context. For literal sentences, in particular, meaning activation is more focused and limited to literal aspects of meaning, whereas if the expression is a metaphor both literal and metaphoric aspects of meaning are activated and maintained during LVF/RH trials even when they are sententially inappropriate.
General discussion
The present study systematically investigated the extent to which each hemisphere is typically involved in understanding metaphors of increasing linguistic complexity. Experiment 1 found similar literal and metaphoric meaning activation of lexical metaphors across both VFs/hemispheres following supportive sentence contexts, even if the context was ambiguous, although priming eVects were generally larger after unambiguous sentences. One argument could be that the lack of hemispheric diVerences for literal and metaphoric meaning activation found in Experiment 1 represents a null result. Experiment 2 used a similar paradigm to investigate more complex metaphors and replicated the Wnding that literal and metaphoric meanings were activated bilaterally if they were sententially consistent. However, an interesting cerebral asymmetry also occurred in Experiment 2 because, in contrast to the RVF/LH, the LVF/RH maintained the activation of sententially inappropriate literal aspects of meaning after metaphoric sentences. Hence it is highly unlikely that the bilateral priming of Experiment 1 can be attributed to the failure to demonstrate a true lateralized eVect.
According to most previous claims, it had been predicted that processing metaphoric meaning would be diYcult for RVF/LH presentations, particularly in ambiguous contexts, whereas for LVF/RH presentations semantic activation had been expected to be generally broad and unconstrained by sentence context. Results did not entirely support these predictions because metaphoric meaning remained active for RVF/LH trials even after ambiguous contexts. With regard to RH processes, although there was evidence for sustained broader meaning activation, the LVF/RH also showed some sensitivity to contextual constraint. An interesting issue for future research will be to determine exactly which aspects of sentence context can aVect RH processing, and how much context is necessary to facilitate RH metaphor comprehension. For instance, would multi-word primes similar to those used in Beeman et al. (1994) summation priming studies, be suYcient to cause metaphor priming, or must the metaphor be expressed in a relatively "normal" sentence context to produce priming?
Although the type of sentence context signiWcantly aVected the degree of literal and metaphoric meaning activation in each hemisphere, the most striking and unexpected outcome from this investigation was the remarkable similarity of literal and metaphor priming eVects in both hemispheres, particularly when the meaning was contextually consistent. Indeed, across the entire study the only condition showing a diVerence was in Experiment 2, where no RVF/LH priming occurred for inconsistent targets, but inappropriate literal aspects of meaning remained active in the LVF/RH after metaphoric sentences. Hence, these results support only in part the claims from Fine-Coarse Coding theory (Beeman, 1998; Beeman et al., 2000) and other investigators (Arambel & Chiarello, 2006; Chiarello, 2003; Faust & Gernsbacher, 1996) that RH processes activate meaning more broadly, and that the LH appears to be primarily responsible for processing sentence constraints to select and integrate only contextually appropriate aspects of meaning.
Prior to discussing the implications of these Wndings in more detail, we Wrst consider some important issues that may challenge our interpretation of the results. First, metaphor targets in both experiments were signiWcantly less imageable than the literal targets (see Tables 2 and 6 ). It is our contention that this imageability diVerence stems from the basic nature of literal and metaphoric meaning (see Footnote 1), and that it would be impossible to match a large set of items on imageability. The literal and metaphoric expressions used in the fMRI study of Rapp et al. (2004) also diVered in imageability, but they did not Wnd corresponding activation in regions like the precuneus, traditionally thought to be involved in imagery. However, there are indications that the RH may be relatively disadvantaged for processing low imageable words (Bub & Lewine, 1988; Day, 1979 , but see Kacinik & Chiarello, 2003) , and a recent ERP study of comparable stimuli has shown that the brain may process metaphoric and abstract meaning in a similar manner (Lovett & Coulson, 2002) . To investigate this possibility in the present study, the imageability of each target word was correlated with that item's average RT and accuracy priming eVects for each visual Weld in each sentence context condition. Many of the correlations were close to 0, with r values ranging from .252 to .009. Considering the general weakness of these correlations, along with the fact that most conditions did not show visual Weld diVerences for literal and metaphor targets, it seems doubtful that the current results were aVected by the imageability diVerence between the literal and metaphor targets.
The second issue deals with the stimulus presentation procedure used in the present study. Primes were centrally presented to both hemispheres with enough time for information to be transferred between the hemispheres before presentation of the lateralized target. Since many of the priming conditions failed to show cerebral asymmetries, it is possible that this procedure obscured potential diVerences between left and right hemispheric sentence processing. However, this is unlikely because the same presentation procedure was used in many previous studies that have found asymmetrical priming for targets presented to the LVF/RH and RVF/LH following various sentence contexts (e.g., Arambel & Chiarello, 2006; Faust & Chiarello, 1998a , 1998b Meyer & Peterson, 2000; Titone, 1998) . Moreover, recent research where ERPs were recorded to laterally presented targets after central sentence primes provides converging evidence that both hemispheres are involved in sentence pro-cessing, with lateralized target words successfully shifting the balance of processing more heavily to the contralateral hemisphere (see Coulson & Williams, 2005; Federmeier & Kutas, 1999 for more thorough discussion). Hence, central presentation of sentence primes should not eliminate the possibility of obtaining asymmetrical priming such as that observed in Experiment 2.
Finally, although the current results are generally in accordance with prior research that has not supported the RH as the preferred substrate for metaphor comprehension (Coulson & Van Petten, 2000; Faust & Weisper, 2000; Lee & Dapretto, 2003; Rapp et al., 2004) , the present study was limited to relatively simple and familiar verbal metaphors in a priming paradigm and lexical decision task. Some recent research has indicated that RH processes may be more important for understanding very unfamiliar and more complex metaphors (Bottini et al., 2007; Mashal et al., 2005; Schmidt, DeBuse, & Seger, 2007) . It is also possible that greater RH involvement would occur with pictorial stimuli (Rinaldi, Marangolo, & Baldassarri, 2004; Winner & Gardner, 1977) , with other Wgurative forms (Coulson & Williams, 2005; Kempler et al., 1999; Van Lancker, 1990) , and in more naturalistic discourse situations involving higher-level inferences and pragmatic processing (Brownell, Gardner, Prather, & Martino, 1995; Sabbagh, 1999) . Regardless of these limitations, the main strength of the present investigation involved the systematic study of normal participants with a large, carefully designed, and normed set of stimuli using the same basic paradigm. The Wndings from the current study will now be used to more thoroughly discuss the manner in which each hemisphere is sensitive to the meaning of literal and metaphoric sentences.
RVF/LH processing
One aim of this research was investigating the extent to which LH processes are involved in understanding metaphoric meaning in relatively natural sentence contexts. It was shown that although the RVF/LH ultimately selects and integrates only sententially appropriate aspects of meaning, a broad range of meanings (literal, Wgurative) was also maintained as long as the meanings remained consistent with the sentence context. It has been claimed that the LH language processor operates to develop the most immediately accurate representation of meaning (Arambel & Chiarello, 2006; Beeman, 1998; Chiarello et al., 2001) . To this end, LH processes are proposed to take advantage of top-down processing and constraints from linguistic (i.e., semantic, grammatical, and syntactic) and real world knowledge domains to select and integrate only contextually consistent meanings (Arambel & Chiarello, 2006; Chiarello et al., 2001; Faust, 1998; Federmeier & Kutas, 1999) . Since the present study indicates that RVF/LH sentence comprehension processes treat literal and metaphoric meaning in a comparable manner, LH processing of these constraints is claimed to be fundamentally similar, regardless of the literal or Wgurative contents of the sentence and how those concepts may interact and blend together. This may explain why RVF/LH metaphor priming was so reliable across experiments, even with ambiguous contexts. If the LH is as successful at using all constraints to process literal and metaphoric meaning, as currently suggested, this would predict that a context would have to "garden-path" LH processing away from a given meaning for any comprehension diYculties to occur. This may explain why ambiguous contexts were not suYcient to cause diYculties with LH activation of metaphoric meanings.
LVF/RH processing
The main purpose of this study was determining whether RH processes are preferentially involved in metaphor comprehension, and the extent to which the RH's contribution involves higher levels of language processing, or is simply due to broader and more sustained semantic activation processes. The issue of "preferential RH metaphor comprehension" could imply that RH processes are more important than those of the LH for understanding metaphors, or alternatively, it could imply that the RH is more involved in processing metaphors than literal language. In all but one condition of the present study, literal and metaphor priming eVects in the RH were similar in magnitude and equivalent to the priming of literal and metaphor targets in the LH. Hence, no matter how one considers the question of "preferential RH involvement," this investigation does not support the hypothesis of the RH being the generally preferred substrate for understanding metaphors.
However, the one condition that showed divergent results across VFs may provide an indication of potential diVerences in the underlying processing mechanisms by which the RH and LH comprehend metaphoric meaning. Since sententially inappropriate literal targets were primed in the LVF/RH after a metaphor sentence, RH processing of a metaphoric expression may be diVerent from that of a literal sentence, and also from LH processing of metaphor. Compared to literal sentences, which generally do not involve the integration of very diVerent conceptual domains, metaphor comprehension is a more complex process where it is less evident which aspects of meaning will ultimately be relevant for the interpretation. For example, That actress is a Xamingo could have a variety of interpretations (e.g., she was FLASHY, SKINNY, had LONG LEGS, wore lots of PINK), all of which are compatible with diVerent features of a "Xamingo." It is therefore likely that all literal and Wgurative aspects of meaning will remain broadly active during metaphor processing only in the RH.
Hence, RH processing may be unique in maintaining the activation of these meanings even if they are no longer consistent with the sentence. We claim that these processes are similar to those responsible for the ability to maintain the activation of semantically related words even when they are grammatically incorrect (Arambel & Chiarello, 2006) , preceded by non-sensical or scrambled sentences (Faust, BabkoV, & Kravetz, 1995; Faust & Chiarello, 1998b ), contextually inappropriate (Faust & Gernsbacher, 1996) , or redundant in the context of a consistent sentence . The current Wndings thus appear to be another indication that the RH can maintain various possible interpretations depending on the word meanings in the sentence, rather than a single coherent representation of the sentence meaning as a whole (Chiarello, 2003) . This likely results from RH diYculty with selecting only contextually appropriate meanings and/or suppressing those that are irrelevant (Arambel & Chiarello, 2006; Faust & Chiarello, 1998a; Faust & Gernsbacher, 1996) . An intriguing possibility is that this sustained activation of inconsistent meanings may also serve a useful purpose, by acting as a safety net or backup system in the event that the interpretation of an expression needs to be revised (see Burgess & Chiarello, 1996; Chiarello, 2003; Chiarello et al., 2001; Faust & Chiarello, 1998a, for similar proposals) . This is possible because exactly which features are important may not be immediately apparent during metaphor comprehension, and may even change as the discourse context unfolds.
In conclusion, this study was aimed at determining whether the RH is preferentially involved in metaphor comprehension, and specifying the extent of LH involvement in understanding metaphors. The LH and RH were found to be generally similar in their access to metaphoric meaning if it was supported by the sentence context. For this reason, there is not enough evidence to conclude that the RH is the preferred neural substrate for comprehending metaphors. Rather, both hemispheres clearly may be involved, although the speciWc processes underlying their contribution(s) to metaphor comprehension remain to be speciWed. However, because the RH did not discard the irrelevant literal aspects of meaning of more complex metaphoric expressions, RH processing may be preferentially involved in cases where an initial interpretation needs to be modiWed. 
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